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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (h), the Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal from a district court's 
judgment regarding support in a divorce case. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO, l: Whether the trial court properly denied 
appellant Ila M. Ernsten's (Wife) Wife's motion for new trial—and 
whether her challenge to the alimony award may be rejected—on the 
ground that she failed her heavy burden to demonstrate clear error 
after marshalling the evidence supporting the verdict and 
presenting it in the light most favorable to the verdict• 
Related to that issue is the question whether, in any 
event, the alimony award is supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. 
Standard of Review: Under Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 804 (Utah 1991), the trial court has broad 
discretion to deny a Utah R. Civ. P. 59 motion for new trial. 
Wife's attack on a verdict must be rejected unless she 
should meet her heavy burden to marshal all the evidence supporting 
the alimony award and demonstrate that, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the alimony award, the evidence is 
insufficient to support it. Id. at 800; W. Fiberglass v. Kirton, 
McConkie Etc. . 789 P.2d 34, 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Findings of fact underlying the judgment will not be 
disturbed "unless evidence on the issue 'so clearly preponderates 
in favor of the appellant that reasonable people would not differ 
on the outcome of the case.'" W. Fiberglass, 789 P.2d at 35 
(quoting Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 
1987)). This Court may not overturn any verdict that is supported 
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by "substantial and competent" evidence. W. Fiberglass, 789 P.2d 
at 35. 
ISSUE NO, 2: Whether the district court made an 
equitable award under Utah standards. 
Standard of Review: Trial courts have broad discretion in 
awarding alimony and its decision will not be disturbed so long as 
the trial court exercises its discretion within the standards set 
by appellate courts. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
A trial court must consider (1) the financial condition 
and needs of the receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to produce sufficient income for herself, and (3) the 
ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Id. 
"If the trial court considers these factors in setting an 
award of alimony, we will not disturb its award absent a showing 
that such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion." Id. 
The clearly erroneous standard of review applies to 
factual findings regarding intent that are implicit in the alimony 
award. Cf. W. Fiberglass, 789 P.2d at 35. Conclusions of law are 
reviewed under the correctness standard. Id. 
ISSUE HO. 3; Whether Chief Judge Michael Murphy erred by 
denying Wife's motion to recuse Judge Young from presiding over 
further proceedings. 
3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW; A judge must disqualified if he 
should be a party, have an interest in the case, be related to 
either party or have been an attorney for either party in the 
action. Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1 (1987). Disqualification based on 
appearance of bias is discretionary. Canon 3 C(l) of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Terral H. Ernsten (Husband) disagrees with Wife's 
assertion this appeal should be governed by Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(3) , which relates to the district court's continuing jurisdiction 
to modify a divorce decree. The appeal concerns the district 
court's refusal to retry the action that resulted in the parties' 
initial Decree of Divorce, and no subsequent modification is 
presently at issue. Nor is interpretation of § 30-3-5(3) not at 
issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Wife styles this as an appeal from the Amended Decree of 
Divorce and Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,1 
entered January 24, 1994, after a bench trial before the Honorable 
David S. Young. Since, however, the district court denied Wife's 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 motion for new trial, dated February 12, 1993, 
1
 Upon Wife's motion, the original Decree of Divorce and Findings 
and Conclusions were amended slightly to include the district 
court's language regarding refinancing. (R. 363-65) 
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(on these same issues with nearly verbatim arguments) (R. 128-
144), the appeal is from the denial of a new trial. 
The following is a recitation of the course of 
proceedings and evidence at trial which supports the district 
court's alimony award and refusal to retry the action. 
1. Husband and Wife were married 42 years and have 
adult, emancipated children (R. 501). 
2. At pretrial Commissioner Sandra Peuler awarded Wife 
$2,000 per month as temporary alimony. (R. 23-25) The 
Commissioner relied in part (R. 547) on Wife's affidavit that she 
was paying $1,000 per month in rent, which she later changed to 
$143. (R. 16-19; Aee's Addenda 1 & 7) At the time, Husband making 
payment on the Fruitland cabin described below. (R. 25) 
3. Before trial the parties stipulated to an equitable 
distribution of property, as set out in Exhibit 6 of Appellant's 
Appendix (App's Appendix). The distribution's value is 
approximately $95,000 to each party (R. 470) 
The fairness of the property distribution is undisputed 
and not at issue in this appeal. (R. 474, 475) 
4. Only the alimony issue remained for the bench trial 
of January 7, 1993. (R. 470, 473) Witnesses at trial included 
* Because Wife's Appendix was incomplete, Husband is required to 
file his own addendum, which will be denominated "Aee's Addendum" 
and placed at the back of Husband's response brief. 
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Husband, Wife and their respective expert witnesses, Guy Morris and 
Randall Peterson. 
5. Regarding the issues relevant to this appeal, 
Husband testified as follows: 
A. Husband is self-employed as a plumber and heating 
repairman employed under the name of Ernsten 
Plumbing & Heat (Ernsten Plumbing or the Company). 
(R. 479) Husband has no other employment. (R. 
482) 
B. Since September 1992, Husband's weekly (1) gross 
pay has been $643.46 and (2) net pay has been 
$420.53. (R. 481) 
C. Before that date Husband grossed $828 per week (R. 
496) and $6,971 per month (R. 497). Husband was 
compelled to cut his own wages, because Ernsten 
Plumbing had a financial crisis (R. 482) and 
"almost closed" (R. 493). The Company could not 
pay its bills, laid off one person and reduced the 
wages of two other employees. (R. 482) 
D. Husband owns certain trucks he leases to Ernsten 
Plumbing at a weekly rate of (1) $780.78 gross and 
(2) $564.78 net. (R. 486) The trucks were valued 
as part of Ernsten Plumbing. (R. 475) 
E. If the truck lease payments were added to Husband's 
salary, which they should not be, Husband's (1) 
6 
weekly net income is $992.66 and (2) average net 
monthly income is $4,301.52. (R. 488) 
F. After deduction of his monthly expenses (mainly 
truck payments) in the amount of $2,399.44, 
Husband's available income is $1,912.08.3 (R. 489, 
490) 
G. From $1,912.08 Husband must pay all truck 
installments and personal living expenses in the 
amount of $4,397 and the $1,450 alimony awarded 
Wife, leaving him with no available personal 
income. (R. 490) 
H. From his $1,912.08 available monthly income, 
Husband was required to pay (1) $2,000 as temporary 
alimony, (2) $450 on Wife's 1991 Ford Explorer and 
(3) $36 on Wife's VISA account, for a total of 
$2,486. (R. 491) 
I. Husband testified he had depleted all the money in 
his bank account, "go[ne] without," and borrowed 
$1,500 from Ernsten Plumbing to pay Wife's 
temporary alimony. (R. 492) 
3
 These figures reflect the amounts to which Husband testified 
minus the $721.10 cabin payment, which Wife assumed. (R. 490) 
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6. Guv Morris has been a licensed C.P.A. since 1975 and 
currently heads an accounting firm employing eight people.4 (R. 
55) Since 1988 Morris has prepared all income tax returns and 
financial statements for Ernsten Plumbing. (R. 519, 520) Morris 
testified as follows: 
A. Depreciation of $32,000 ($8,000 per year) on 
Husband's trucks leased to Ernsten Plumbing should 
not be added back in as his personal income. (R. 
520-522) Depreciation is relevant to an income tax 
deduction credit. (R. 530) 
B. Ernsten Plumbing's corporate net income should not 
be factored into Husband's personal available 
income. (R. 521) 
C. Most businesses do not pay out all profits as 
dividends, but rather, "retain a certain level of 
earnings over the year and build up their capital 
in the business." (R. 521) 
D. Small businesses generally start with less money 
than they need. A business' earnings are usually 
retained, because creditors will not continue to 
lend money if the owners should "take out every 
penny." (R. 521, 522) 
4
 When Husband's counsel attempted to lay a foundation for Morris' 
expertise, the district court cut counsel short, saying there were 
no qualification problems. 
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Apart from new capital infusions or increased stock 
sales, retention of earnings is the primary means 
of showing increased capital on financial 
statements, (R. 522) 
Historically Husband's creditors (banks) have 
wanted to see financial statements that show the 
equity in the company increasing. (R. 522) 
Monies Ernsten Plumbing earned were not available 
for distribution. In Morris7 emphatic words: "So 
although, yes, these monies were earned by the 
corporation, were they available to distribute? No 
sir, they were not. . . . " (R. 522) 
Thus Ernsten Plumbing's $14,000 corporate income 
for 1992 was not available to Husband for personal 
spending. (R. 522, 526) Distribution would have 
been contrary to "prudent management decisions" and 
"economic forces that impact the business and 
operation of the business." (R. 526) 
Ernsten Plumbing did not experience an equity 
increase in 1992 and a future increase cannot be 
predicted. (R. 528, 529) 
Wife testified as follows: 
Wife was a 60-year-old "severe" diabetic who takes 
insulin daily. (R. 532) 
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B. The parties never lived together in the cabin at 
Fruitland, Utah. (R. 533) 
MR. PETERSON (Wife's counsel): [W]as [the Fruitland 
cabin] your marital residence during the 
latter years of your marriage? 
WIFE: Well, just the last few months of our 
marriage, well, before he filed for divorce . 
. . He said he would travel back and forth, 
only he never did. 
(UL.) 
C. At the time of trial, Wife lived for an entire year 
alone in her sister's Salt Lake City condominium 
for a minimal rent of $140 in condominium fees.5 
(R. 534, 537, 545) 
D. Wife would return to the Fruitland cabin only in 
the summer when weather permitted. (R. 536) 
E. Wife never bought horses; her husband did. (R. 
534) Wife traveled to Brazil only twice in her 
married life. (R. 534) 
F. Wife intends to sell the Fruitland cabin to fund 
her retirement. (R. 538) Wife will also receive 
$25,000 from division of Husband's IRA. (R. 538) 
8. Husband's Schedule of Monthly Cash Flow shows a 
fixed monthly debt service for truck installment payments of $1854, 
5
 Wife's counsel self-servingly referred to the Fruitland cabin as 
the "marital residence" and Wife's "primary residence." (R. 533, 
534) The evidence is to the sharp contrary. 
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as set out infra in 5 5D. (Aee's Addendum 4) Husband also had a 
fixed monthly debt service of: 
(1) $255 (20 payments remaining for a total of $5,100) 
that resulted from his obtaining a loan to pay the 
couples' 1991 income tax. (Id.) 
(2) $160 (18 payments remaining for a total $2880) that 
resulted from buying furniture Wife was awarded. 
(I<LJ 
(3) $120 (4 payments remaining for a total of $480) 
related to personal vehicles. fid.) 
9. Randall Petersen. Wife's "expert" witness is a 
C.P.A. who happens to be her nephew. (R. 406) Wife's counsel and 
Petersen have been "best friends" for over 20 years (since 1971) 
and have "traveled the world together." (R. 406) Even their wives 
are often confused for each other. (Id.) Petersen has appeared as 
expert witness for Wife's counsel's clients. (Id.) 
Petersen testified as follows: 
A. Petersen reviewed solely (1) the parties' 1988-1991 
individual income tax returns and (2) only the 
income from, but not Vaughan Cox' actual report of 
Ernsten Plumbing's income for the fiscal years 
1998-91. (R:408, 432, 447) 
B. Depreciation should be added back into Ernsten 
Plumbing's net "spendable income" because it is a 
non-cash expense and the Company did not have to 
11 
write a check for it. (R. 412, 426, 444, 445,) 
Petersen gave no authoritative basis for his 
"opinion." The district court clearly accepted 
Morris' opinion that cash expended and depreciation 
equal out. (R. 429) 
Later he retracted his testimony and said cash 
expended and depreciation equal themselves out, 
depending on how the asset is depreciated. (R. 
427) Petersen did not have the depreciation 
schedules on the trucks. (R. 429) 
Petersen thinks most of the trucks were paid off by 
1991. (R. 427) In fact Husband's Exhibit 5 shows 
a 223 monthly truck installments for a total of 
approximately $93,000 remaining. (Husband's 
Exhibit 5; Aee's Addendum 4) 
Ernsten Plumbing's net profit is income available 
to Husband for his personal use. (R. 413, 414) 
Petersen's bald conclusion was unsupported by a 
scintilla of evidence or authoritative basis for 
his "opinion." Petersen did not examine Ernsten 
Plumbing's financial statements; he "simply" had 
the appraiser's report. (R. 434) He acknowledged 
he had no idea whether Ernsten Plumbing's cash was 
available and merely conjectured that "the $30,000 
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earned in 1988 would theoretically be available in 
1989. fid.) 
F. Because the Fruitland cabin is not producing any 
income Wife's Fruitland cabin should not be 
considered an idle working asset to offset 
Husband's Company as an active working asset, . 
(R. 419, 420) 
G. Husband is replacing his salary with truck lease 
payments. (R. 420) Petersen's statement was 
totally uncorroborated by evidence showing Husband 
simultaneously increased his lease payments and 
decreased his salary. To the contrary, the 
evidence is that the lease payments remained 
essentially the same throughout the period in 
question. (R. 486, 487) 
H. Petersen acknowledged it could be considered 
foolhardy for Husband to put Ernsten Plumbing at 
risk by taking profits out of it. (R. 497) 
I. Petersen hypothesized Husband could have cut his 
salary to $20,000 and left $50,000 in the Company. 
(R. 497) He admitted he did not do an audit and 
has no idea whether Ernsten Plumbing's profits were 
available to Husband. (Id.) 
MR. WARD (Husband's counsel): You do not know 
whether this money was available to [Husband]. 
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PETERSEN: No, I didn't do an audit. 
Q: You don't know whether it was distributed to 
him. 
A: Apparently it was not because it didn't show 
up on his tax return. 
Petersen did not factor into his. "cash flow 
analysis" the monthly installments Husband is 
required to pay on the trucks. (R. 489) He did 
not have those numbers before him. (Id.) 
Petersen agreed with the district court that Wife's 
Fruitland cabin could be considered an income 
producing asset. (R. 492, 493, 494) 
PETERSEN (responding to district court's comment): 
I believe your analogy is correct on the 
cabin. I believe that if we use the income 
that comes from the asset, the business, that 
we have, you would have to take make an 
assumption that the cabin has value, and if 
you converted it to cash, whatever the equity 
might be between the debt that's owed on it 
and its value, then you would assume some kind 
of income, attribute some kind of income. 1 
don't think that would be inappropriate. I 
think that the cabin does represent a non-
income-producing asset that is being reflected 
in the income of the two party. I agree. But 
to ignore the lease payments, I think, would 
not be the correct way, because the 
corporation is, in fact, generating income and 
I think the income is being represented here. 
(R. 493) (Emphasis added.) 
PETERSEN: . . . [T]he corporation is known, the 
corporation has facts and figures you can rely 
on. They have been prepared by an independent 
CPA. I think the figures are there and if you 
want to take the cabin and ascribe some income 
theory from that to offset, to reduce income 
14 
or increase the value of the income and 
ascribe it to her, that might be appropriate. 
That I did not do. 
(R. 494) (Emphasis added.) 
Petersen acknowledged that, unlike the trucks, the 
Fruit land cabin will not wear out and require 
replacement. (R. 496) 
Following the trial, the district court made the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
The property should be divided consistent with the 
parties7 Stipulation and Agreement under which each 
party was awarded a marital estate worth $95,215. 
(R. 452) 
Husband's (gross) income is $648 per week or $2808 
per month. (R. 453) 
Husband's working asset (Ernsten Plumbing) is 
considered to produce income at an average nominal 
rate of 8 1/2 percent. (R. 453) Husband's asset 
actually grosses $780.78 per month, so $106.34, the 
difference between the imputed and actual income, 
will be added to Husband's income for a total of 
$2,914.34. fid.) 
Husband's monthly income of $2,914.34 multiplied by 
52 weeks and divided by 12 months equals $1457 per 
month. (R. 453) 
Husband should pay Wife $1450 per month alimony. 
(R. 454) 
Husband will pay property taxes on the Fruitland 
cabin for 1992, and after that Wife will pay the 
taxes. (R. 454) 
Husband will pay the taxes and registration on 
Wife's vehicle, which are approximately $275. (R. 
454) 
Husband will pay $4,000 of Wife's attorneys' fees. 
(R. 454) 
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In post-ruling comments responding to Wife's counsel's 
requests for findings on Wife's expenses for the Fruitland cabin 
and her vehicle, the district court stated Wife's $721 per month 
payment on the Fruitland cabin is not an equitable basis for 
determining her rent, because, with only nine payments remaining, 
the cabin and vehicle could be refinanced over 15 or so years for 
a combined nominal amount. (R. 455-56, 59) Wife has an obligation 
to engage in financial planning just like anyone else. (R. 458) 
11. During the trial, Judge Young questioned Petersen on 
the issue whether Wife's Fruitland cabin could also be treated as 
an income-producing asset that would offset Husband's income 
producing asset, the truck leases with Ernsten Plumbing. Not once 
during the trial did Wife's counsel object to Judge Young's 
guestions—neither their scope nor content. 
12. Judge Young did not give deliver his bench ruling 
until January 8, 1994, the day after Petersen's testimony. (R. 45-
63) Although wife's counsel requested clarification of the bench 
ruling, he never objected to Judge Young's comportment at trial. 
13. Wife filed a Notice of Appeal on February 1, 1994. 
(R. 399-400) 
14. On February 12, 1993, Wife moved for a new trial, 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1) and (7). (R. 128-130) Wife's 
appellate brief is essentially a cut-and-paste job of her 
memorandum in support of that motion. (R. 131-41) 
16 
15. Also on February 12, 1994, Wife moved to recuse 
Judge Young from any further involvement in the case, under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 63(b). (R. 118-19) That supporting memorandum was the 
other half of the cut-and-paste job that comprises Wife's appellate 
brief. (R. 120-27) 
16. Chief Judge Michael J. Murphy denied the motion for 
recusal, thereby rejecting Wife's precise recusal arguments 
presented on appeal. (R. 352-53; Aee's Addendum 9) Specifically 
Judge Murphy held: 
A. Wife admits Judge Young exhibited no bias against 
her or her counsel personally. (R. 352 (citing 
Wife's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Recusal, 
dated February 12, 1993, at 7)) 
B. Wife's complaint is that Judge Young refused to 
consider business assets awarded to Husband in 
determining Wife's alimony. (R. 352, 353) 
C. The correctness of Judge Young's decision should be 
addressed to the appellate court. (R. 353) 
D. Wife fails legally and factually to show prejudice 
from Judge Young's pretrial comment that Wife 
should accept $1400 per month alimony because she 
was not likely to be awarded more at trial. (R. 
353-54) Judge Young awarded $50 more per month 
than the amount he indicated would be high. (R. 
354) 
E. The claim of "prejudgment," if accepted, would 
"undermine" Third District pretrial practice, which 
allows judges and commissioners the opportunity to 
participate in settlement of domestic relations 
cases. (R. 354) In Judge Murphy's words: 
Such direct intervention by adjudicators allow 
the parties to hear what the outcome of trial 
may be under various factual assumptions based 
on proffers. This practice is a legitimate 
and traditional one which generally proceeds 
17 
without claims of prejudgment directed at the 
assigned judge. . . . 
(Id. ) 
F. Wife's evidence was "insufficient to render 
inapplicable a concept legitimately raised by the 
assigned judge in a pretrial settlement 
conference." (R. 354) No bias or prejudice was 
manifest at the pretrial conference. (Id.) 
G. Wife did not raise the bias or prejudice issue at 
the pretrial conference or during the three 
intervening days before trial. (R. 355) 
Presentation at the post-trial juncture prejudices 
Husband and limited judicial resources, since Wife 
sought a new judge to resolve the motion for a new 
trial. (Id.) 
H. No bias or prejudice resulted from the fact that 
Judge Young acknowledged Husband's truck leases 
saved him taxes. (R. 355) 
I. Neither "the fact of nor the quantum of [Judge 
Young's] examination" of Wife's expert witness, in 
a non-jury trial, demonstrates bias. (R. 355) 
H. Wife did not demonstrate actual bias or prejudice 
and her affidavit was untimely and therefore 
legally insufficient. (R. 355) 
I. Judge Young was to resolve all post-trial motions. 
17. On December 13, 1993, the district court denied 
Wife's motion for a new trial, thereby rejecting Wife's precise 
alimony arguments presented on appeal. (R. 360-62; Aee's Addendum 
8) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This is an appeal from the district court's denial of 
Wife's motion for a new trial solely on the amount of her alimony 
award. 
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First, this Court must affirm the district court's 
alimony award, because Wife not only failed to marshal the evidence 
supporting the award, but rather, selected and postured "facts" to 
reargue her case on appeal. 
Second, in determining Wife's alimony award, the district 
court properly considered each of the Utah three factors and 
essentially divided Husband's available income in half. For that 
reason, the district court saw no reason to grant Wife a new trial. 
Specifically Wife contends the district court erred in 
suggesting that, through refinancing, she could reduce monthly 
payments on her vehicle and the $75,000 Fruitland cabin that had 
only nine payments outstanding. Wife, however, offered no evidence 
that she could not refinance at a typical rate that would leave her 
with low payments. 
Next Wife contends the Fruitland cabin which had lain 
idle for a year and to which she cannot travel bad weather should 
not be considered an income producing asset to offset certain truck 
lease payments to Husband. The district court properly found 
Wife's position incredible. 
Finally Wife spuriously contends the district court erred 
in calculating Husband's available income. Wife presented no 
competent evidence supporting her attack. Her "expert" witness was 
her nephew and her counsel's best friend who had not examined 
critical records and in fact agreed with the Court's methodology 
for imputation of income. Wife simply offered no evidence to 
19 
controvert Husband's testimony that his current income reflected a 
downturn in his business. 
In any event the alimony award was equitable considering 
all Wife's hypothesized methods of calculating income. 
Third, Wife argues the district court was biased, but 
does not request reversal on that basis — she merely wants a new 
judge should this case be reversed and remanded. That request is 
frivolous. Wife does not complain the district court was biased 
against her personally, but rather, that it became overly engrossed 
in its theory of imputing income to the parties. A judge's strong 
feelings for a position do not equal bias. This Court should 
affirm Judge Murphy's thorough denial of Wife's motion to recuse as 
untimely and meritless. 
Fourth, Wife is not entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal 
because she failed her marshalling duty and presents no evidence of 
clear error below. Moreover she presents no evidence supporting 
her ridiculous request for $2750 per month, when the district court 
found Husband's gross salary was only $2808 per month. 
This is appeal is nothing but shadow boxing and may be 
summarily dismissed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT MAY REJECT THIS APPEAL OUTRIGHT BECAUSE 
WIFE FAILED UTTERLY TO MEET THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
REQUIRING HER TO MARSHAL ALL THE EVIDENCE AND SHOW 
CLEAR ERROR. 
For one unassailable reason, this Court need go no 
further in considering Wife's lack of meritorious issues on appeal: 
She did not even attempt to meet the appellate standard of review 
for challenging the district court's Findings and Conclusions, that 
is, to marshal the evidence supporting the alimony award then 
demonstrate clear error in its amount. Wife exhibits the same 
fundamental failure as Appellant Anita: 
Anita questions the termination of temporary 
alimony. . . . [Her] attack is simply an 
attack on the finding of cohabitation. 
However, in that attack, she wholly fails to 
take into account our standard of review. We 
do not reverse a trial court's finding of fact 
unless the appellant marshals all evidence 
relevant to the finding and then shows the 
finding to be clearly erroneous. We therefore 
uphold the termination of temporary alimony. 
Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134, 136 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis 
added); Allred v. Allred. 835 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(cited by Wife; appellate court affirmed without comment because 
appellant failed to marshal evidence). 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently stated how carefully 
appellants must marshal evidence and why appellate courts will not 
give a moment of consideration to those who do not. 
Utah appellate courts do not take courts' 
factual findings lightly. We repeatedly have 
set forth the heavy burden appellants must 
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bear when challenging factual findings. To 
successfully appeal a trial court's findings 
of fact, appellate counsel must play the 
devil's advocate. '[Attorneys] must extricate 
[themselves] from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to 
properly discharge the ["marshaling duty] . . . 
the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. 
Oneida v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 236 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 24 (Utah Ct. App. April 1, 1994) (emphasis added; emphasis of 
"supports" in original; extensive citations omitted). 
The Oneida court also articulated the appellant's post-
marshalling duty under the "rigorous/1 id. , clearly erroneous 
standard: 
Once appellants have established every pillar 
supporting their adversary's position, they 
'must then ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence' and show why those pillars fail to 
support the trial court's findings. They must 
show the trial court's findings are 'so 
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence,' thus making them 
clearly erroneous. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In the instant case Wife did precisely the opposite from 
marshalling; she exhibited highly selective perception in pulling 
together a smattering facts she wrongfully supposed help her and 
then postured them to retry her case on appeal. She ignored 
altogether Husband's compelling evidence supporting the alimony 
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award. Indeed Oneida, id. , might have been describing Wife's 
failure of her duties: 
Oneida has failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's factual findings. 
Rather than bearing its marshaling burden, 
Oneida has merely presented carefully selected 
facts and excerpts of trial testimony in 
support of its position. Such selective 
citation to the record does not begin to 
marshal the evidence; it is nothing more than 
attempting to reargue her case before this 
court—a tactic that we reject. 
Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also, e.g., DeBry v. 
Cascade Enterprises. 1994 WL 316962 (Utah July 1, 1994) ("In 
purporting to marshal the evidence, the DeBrys [appellants] refer 
to their own evidence and cite only those facts that support their 
position. They essentially reargue the evidence as if the appeal 
were a trial de novo."). 
Wife, as did the Oneida appellant, failed her two-fold 
duty to "show [1] how the court found the facts from the evidence 
and [2] why such findings contradict the weight of the evidence 
supporting the award." Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
For that reason, the Oneida court had no trouble 
affirming the district court without analysis or even comment. 
Because Oneida has failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings, we hold that those findings are 
accurate and affirm the trial court's 
dismissal based on those findings. 
As we decline to consider the merits of 
Oneida's appeal, we take the occasion to 
further articulate our rationale behind the 
marshaling requirement. . . . 
Id, (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also, e.g., Allred, 
835 P.2d at 979 (appellate court affirmed without comment because 
appellant failed to marshal evidence). 
Oneida court then went on to discuss the two 
"interrelated court objectives" of efficiency and fairness. Id. 
Efficiency relates to the district court's enhanced ability to 
determine credibility. Id. at 25, 26. Fairness relates to the 
inequity of requiring the appellee to do precisely what Husband was 
required to do: Appellant-Wife's job of marshaling the evidence. 
Wife's failure to meet her marshaling duty allows this 
Court to dismiss her appeal without comment. In any event, the 
evidence Husband marshaled amply supports the alimony award. 
II. WIFE'S ALIMONY AWARD 18 FAIR UNDER UTAH STANDARDS. 
Wife contends the district court erred by overlooking (1) 
Wife's needs in finding she could adjust her expenses by 
refinancing the Fruitland cabin and her vehicle,6 (2) Wife's 
ability to produce sufficient income for herself in finding the 
Fruitland cabin could become converted from an idle asset to an 
income producing asset, and (3) Husband's ability to provide 
support by not factoring back into Husband's present income (a) his 
pre-1992 "historical earnings," (b) Ernsten Plumbing's net 
corporate profits and (c) truck lease "profits." 
6
 Wife's stated value for the vehicle is a typographical error 
that should be corrected to read $16,000 rather than $1600. (App. 
Brief at 34) 
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All Wife's arguments founder under applicable standards 
of review and Utah case authority governing alimony awards. 
Trial courts have broad discretion in 
awarding alimony. We will not disturb the 
trial court's alimony award so long as the 
trial court exercises its discretion within 
the standards set by the appellate courts.. 
'The purposes of an alimony award include 
enabling the receiving spouse to maintain, as 
nearly as possible, the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage,' and preventing 
him or her from becoming a public charge. 
Haumont, 793 P.2d at 423 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
To this end, it is well established that in 
setting an award of alimony, a trial court 
must consider (1) the financial condition and 
needs of the receiving spouse, (2) the ability 
of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient 
income for herself, and (3) the ability of the 
responding spouse to provide support. 
Id. 
"If the trial court considers these factors in setting an 
award of alimony, we will not disturb its award absent a showing 
that such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion." Id. (reversal only because district court 
made virtually no findings of fact). 
First, the district court has already rejected Wife's 
verbatim arguments on appeal—which rejection bolsters dismissal of 
the appeal. 
A trial court's denial of a motion for new 
trial is in effect a mistrial motion, which 
will not be overturned on appeal absent an 
abuse of discretion. We presume the trial 
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court exercised proper discretion unless the 
record clearly shows the contrary. 
Logan City v. Carlsen. 799 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(emphasis added); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah 1991) 
("We note that the trial court considered defendant's insufficiency 
of the evidence claim in denying the motion for a new trial. This 
action lends further weight to the [judgment]."). 
A. The District Court Fairly Considered Wife's Needs. 
Wife is misplaced in her contention the district court 
overlooked her needs by factoring into her alimony award her 
ability to refinance the Fruitland cabin and vehicle. The Court 
merely observed that, with only nine payments remaining on the 
cabin, she could reduce the $700+ payment to a nominal amount. (R. 
455-59) The Court also properly observed the vehicle could be 
refinanced to reduce its monthly payment. (Id.) 
Wife presented no evidence that she could not refinance 
her two assets or any good reason why she, as anyone else, should 
not be required to undertake financial planning. 
B. The District Court Fairly Considered Wife's Ability 
to Produce Income for Herself. 
Obviously the district court did not wholly accept Wife's 
counsel's argument that the Fruitland cabin was the "marital 
residence." 
COURT: I'm not talking about where the person lives, I'm 
talking about a recreational property and I'm 
talking about something that could be sold and 
changed into a working asset 
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(R. 421) (emphasis added). Evidence supporting that finding 
included Wife's testimony the parties never lived in the Fruitland 
cabin together, she lived for the past year at her sister's 
condominium, she cannot travel to Fruitland in winter months and 
she plans to sell the cabin for her retirement. 
Consequently the district court correctly treated her 
"recreational property" as income producing that would offset 
Husband's truck leases.8 
(!• The District Court Equitably Distributed Husband's 
Available Income. 
The attached matrices show the district court equitably 
divided Husband's income, under the "historical versus current"9 
and "truck leases" theories Wife advances.10 Aee's Addenda 10 & 
This Court can take judicial notice that Fruitland is located in 
an isolated area on Highway 40, which is approximately 90 miles 
from Salt Lake City, 40 miles from Heber City and 30 miles from 
Duchesne. 
Wife would have the court believe that, in her severe 
state of diabetes, she would live alone in Fruitland permanently. 
8
 Wife incorrectly states that English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 
(1977), and Fletcher v. Fletcher. 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). Those 
cases say nothing more than that alimony and property distributions 
are determined by different criteria. Here, the district court did 
not factor the income producing assets into the alimony division; 
it merely held they were a wash. 
9
 Hinckley v. Hinckley. 815 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(modification case). 
1 0
 Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), is 
clearly inapposite, because that husband netted an available income 
nearly 3 to 4 times higher than the wife's. 
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11. Moreover the matrices show the truck lease "profits" to 
Husband nearly matched his monthly debt service on them. Id. 
Against the evidence that Wife makes the preposterous 
demand that this Court should award Wife $2750 retroactive to the 
date of the Decree of Divorce. 
Regarding adding in the corporate net profits, Wife's own 
"expert" nephew conceded he had reviewed no documents and could 
offer no testimony to rebut Morris7 testimony that the corporate 
funds were not available to Husband. 
Wife's star case, Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d 736, 741 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992), supports Husband's position, because it holds 
corporate net profits should not be added to Husband's income 
unless it can be shown the money stayed in the corporation for 
discretionary improvements that would benefit Husband rather than 
to "maintain [the business'] present condition." 
Wife offered no evidence to rebut Husband's testimony his 
business was failing and the corporate profits were left in to save 
the business. 
The district court divided right down the middle what it 
found to be Husband's available income and any discrepancy is 
minute amounting to harmless error.11 
1 1
 'Harmless error is defined . . . as an error 
that is "sufficiently inconsequential that we 
conclude there is no reasonable likelihood 
that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings."' Put in other words, an error 
is harmful only if the likelihood of a 
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III. AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION WILL MOOT 
THE ISSUE OF JUDGE YOUNG'S RECUSAL ON REMAND. IN 
ALL EVENTS, WIFE HAS WAIVED RECUSAL ISSUES AND NOT 
SHOWN GROUNDS FOR REVERSING JUDGE MURPHY'S DENIAL 
OF RECUSAL BELOW. 
As a threshold legal technicality, Wife did not appeal 
Judge Murphy's order denying disqualification of Judge Young; 
consequently the issue is not properly before this Court. 
Regarding the merits or rather lack thereof, Wife does 
not assert Judge Young showed bias against her personally12; 
rather, that his statement at the pretrial and questioning of 
Petersen showed he was engrossed in his position that the Fruit land 
cabin could be considered a working asset. (App. Br. at 39) 
Further Wife does not assert Judge Young's conduct 
amounted to reversible error; she did not below and does not on 
appeal request a new trial on the basis of bias or prejudice. 
(App. Brief at 39-41; R. 131-41) Rather Wife merely wants a 
different judge to consider any possible remand, just the same as 
different outcome is sufficiently high as to 
undermine our confidence in the verdict. 
Crookston. 817 P.2d at 796 (quotations omitted). 
1 2
 For this reason, Mar chant v. Mar chant, 743 P. 2d 199, 207 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987), is wholly inapposite. There Judge Tibbs denied the 
wife any alimony whatsoever and displayed personal bias against the 
wife by his comments pooh-poohing domestic violence as a basis for 
divorce. 
Wife's reliance on Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523-
25 (Utah 1948) , is even more puzzling. That case defines "bias and 
prejudice" as "a hostile feeling of ill will toward one of the 
litigants, or undue friendship or favoritism toward one." 
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she wanted a different judge to consider her motion for new trial. 
(App. Brief, at 41) 
First, the recusal issue is moot since Wife's appeal 
lacks any legal or factual basis for reversal and remand. 
Second, the trial was to the bench; hence, there was no 
jury to prejudice and Judge Young expressed none. 
Third, Wife waived all claims related to recusal by not 
raising them immediately after "the facts which formfed] the basis 
for disqualification became known." Madsen v. Prudential, 767 P.2d 
538, 541-44 (Utah 1989); Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b). 
This case is nearly identical to Madsen, in which the 
Utah Supreme Court considered waived and refused to hear 
disqualification issues first raised .39 days after the alleged 
impropriety. Id. at 541. Here Wife did not first raise her 
disqualification issues until .39. days after the pretrial conference 
and .35. days after the trial. (Pretrial Conference): (R. ) ; 
Trial: January 7, 1994; Motion to Recuse: February 12, 1994 (R. 
118, 119). 
Stating the judicial and public policy reasons for 
requiring expedient disqualification motions, Madsen held a motion 
to disqualify should be filed no more than 10 days after the 
alleged conduct occurs. Madsen. 767 P.2d at 543 ("Timeliness is 
essential in filing a motion to disqualify"; "State courts . . . 
also impose[] stringent timeliness requirements"). 
30 
Moreover, like the Madsen appellant, Wife not only failed 
to object at trial but appeared to acquiesce in Judge Young's 
decision. Id. Also, as in Madsen, Wife "was not convinced at the 
time of the ruling that Judge [Young] should have recused himself." 
Id. at 544. 
Fourth, as set out fully in Judge Murphy's flat rejection 
of Wife's word-for-word arguments (R. 352-353); Aee's Addendum 9, 
Judge Young did not show bias or prejudice by his pretrial remarks 
or questioning Peterson at the bench trial. 
The fact that a judge may have an opinion as 
to the merits of the cause or that he has 
strong feelings about the type of litigation 
involved, does not make him biased or 
prejudiced. 
Haslam, 190 P.2d at 525 (emphasis added). 
Wife's recusal issue may be altogether ignored as 
patently frivolous. 
IV. WIFE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES ON THIS 
FRIVOLOUS APPEAL. 
Wife relies on Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1027 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993), in support of her request of attorneys' fees on 
appeal. Hall lends no such support. Applying the following two-
step process, that court rejected the wife's claim she was entitled 
to attorneys' fees on appeal: 
1. The requesting party was must have been awarded 
attorneys' fees below and 
2. must have "substantially prevailed" on appeal. 
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Id. The Hall wife satisfied the first prong by being awarded 
attorneys' fees at trial, but failed the second prong, because the 
court determined that (except for a few minor questions) the 
husband prevailed on the major issues in dispute.13 Id. 
Wife cannot prevail on appeal since (in addition to 
mounting legally and factually meritless arguments) , she has failed 
the threshold burden to marshal all the evidence and show clear 
error. Barber, 792 P.2d at 136. 
Wife's request for attorneys' fees must be rejected out 
of hand. 
CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons, Husband respectfully requests that 
the Court summarily dismiss Wife's appeal for failure of her heavy 
duty "fastidiously" to marshal "every scrap of evidence" supporting 
the alimony award and demonstrate the district court's clears error 
in making the award. Moreover the District Court properly and 
equitably followed Utah alimony standards. 
13
 Wife is equally mistaken in her reliance on Allred, 835 P.2d at 
979, because there the wife received attorneys' fees on appeal only 
because the husband's "attempt to acquire the tax exemption award 
necessitated the present appeal." Id. 
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Husband respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
district court's denial of Wife's motion for a new trial and Judge 
Murphy's denial of her motion to recuse. 
DATED this day of September, 1994. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I herewith certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing substitute of RESPONSE BRIEF OF APPELLEES was hand-
delivered by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following counsel 
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The replaced Response Brief of Appellee was mailed by 
U.S. mail, postage prepaid on the 16th day of September, 1994. 
Craig M. Peterson, Esq. 
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Attorney for Defendant 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
y>* i, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
TERRAL H. ERNSTSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ILA M. ERNSTSEN, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ILA M. ERNSTSEN 
Case No. 914904104DA 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ILA M. ERNSTSEN, being first duly sworn upon oath 
deposes, and states as follows: 
1. I am the Defendant above-named. 
2. The Plaintiff and I have been married for forty 
years. There are now no minor children remaining as issue of our 
marriage. 
3. I have not been employed during the marriage, except 
to assist my husband with our family-owned business, Ernstsen 
00016 
Plumbing and Heating. I am fifty-nine (59) years old, unemployed 
and unemployable. I am in need of temporary support. 
4. I am aware that the Plaintiff's income is at least 
$65,000 annually and his effective tax rate is approximately 
twenty-five (25%) percent resulting in a net income of at least 
$48,750 annually. It is obvious that the Plaintiff's net income is 
at least $4,000 per month. I believe it is reasonable based upon 
the terms of our marriage and earned income that the Plaintiff pay 
alimony in the amount of $2,000 per month. 
5. I have monthly expenses which will require me to 
rent a home in the Salt Lake City area, pay my own utilities, pay 
for my own food and household expenses, as well as all other 
monthly expenses. I estimate that my monthly expenses will be at 
least as follows: 
Rent 
Phone 
Heat 
Lights 
Health Insurance 
Life Insurance 
Auto Insurance 
Auto maintenance 
Car Wash 
Gasoline 
License, taxes 
Food 
Insulin, Other Medication 
Newspaper, Magazines 
Milk delivery 
Clothes 
Miscellaneous 
Tithing 
2 
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$1,000.00 
50.00 
75.00 
65.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
50.00 
30.00 
80.00 
17.00 
200.00 
100.00 
25.00 
20.00 
100.00 
100.00 
200.00 
unknown 
unknown 
unknown 
per month 
Fast Offerings 20.00 
Missionary Fund 20.00 
Beautician 175.00 
Birthday, Christmas, etc. 300.00 
Entertainment 100.00 
Travel 335.00 
Income Tax 150.00 
Chiropractor 50.00 
TOTAL 3,262.00 
6. I believe it is reasonable that I have discretionary 
income for other matters which are not listed as part of my 
expenses and, further, that my income be at least equal to that of 
the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the request for $2,000 for temporary 
alimony is a reasonable request. 
7. I am not aware of any outstanding liabilities we 
have. If there are any, I believe it is reasonable that the 
Plaintiff maintain those liabilities. 
8. I have access to an automobile which provides for my 
transforation. I believe it is reasonable that I continue to 
maintain the use of that automobile which is a 1990 Ford Van. 
9. I have absolutely no funds for the services of an 
attorney. I am advised by my attorney that a retainer in the 
amount of $3,000 will be required to continue to maintain his 
representation in this matter. I believe it is reasonable that the 
Plaintiff be ordered to pay temporary attorney's fees in the amount 
of $3,000. 
* 3 
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FURTHER, your Affiant sayeth not. 
ILA M. ERNSTSEN 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me by 
ILA M. ERNSTSEN, the signer of the foregoing document. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this }r day of ^OetotSeF, 
1991. 
NOTA^YPUBLIC 
„ Residing at Sa£& f^.L.Cib (J^L . 
My commission expires: -*-'k KP/^ 0 
14. **#* r w 
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Tab 2 
Nov V: $ *« F"'»Ql 
Civil tfb. 91490-4104 DA 
INCOME & EXPENSE STATEMENT 
1. Income 
a. Wages paid from Ernstsen Plumbing and Heating $3,588 
b. vehicles owned by plaintiff and leased back 
to the plumbing and heating company 3,383 
TOTAL $6,971 
2• Expenses 
1. Mortgage payment on fruitland cabin and garage $1,215 
2. Gas/electricity " " " " 225. 
3. Phone 100. 
4. maintenance, hired help on fruitland property 450. 
5. Hay & feed for horses and dogs 325. 
6. food and laundry 450. 
7. Vetrinary expense (average) 100. 
8. Callisters for horse tack and equipment 125. 
9. Vehicle payments (see attachment) 1,717. 
10. Vehicle maintenance/ repairs, gas 390. 
11. Clothing 50. 
12. Credit Union payment 260. 
13. insurance for car 30. 
14. IRA contribution 175. 
TOTAL $5,612. 
3. Non listed anticipated expenses 
1. Rent $500 
2. Utilities 75 
3. Telephone 40 
4. Entertainment/ restaurant 200 
TOTAL $815 
00020 
Tab 3 
ERNSTSEN PLUMBING & HEATING, INC. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
1PL0YEE NAME: ERNSTSEN, TERRAL H. 
1CIAL SEC. # : 5 2 6 - 4 0 - 5 7 4 4 
»Y PERIOD: 12/28/92 - 01/03/9,* 
EMPLOYEE ID: 
CHECK NUMBER 
CHECK DATE: 
El 
10455 
01/05/9; 
IGs HOURS: 
T: HOURS: 
0.00 PAY 
O.00 PAY 
GROSS PAY 
iDERAL INCOME TAX: 
CA: 
ATE INCOME TAX: 
ICAL INCOME TAX: 
643.46 
O. 00 
643.46 
96.85-
49.22-
31.05-
0. 00 
OTHER DEDUCTION 1 
PENSION PLAN 
OTHER DEDUCTION 3 
OTHER DEDUCTION 4 
OTHER DEDUCTION 5 
TOTAL WITHHOLDING 
NET PAY 
0. 00 
33.46-
0. 00 
0. 00 
0. 00 
427.88 
YEAR-TO-DATE 
GROSS PAY FED TAX FICA TAX STATE TAX LOCAL TAX OTHER W/H 
643.46 96.85 49.22 31.05 0.00 38.46 
NET PAY 
427.88 
Tab 4 
Tc„rr h) \ E-rVNt>T *+ V\ 
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Tab 5 
I * ,' DEFENDANT'! 
EXHIBIT^ 
Wm 
Ernstsen v. Ernstsen 
DEFENDANTS CURRENT MONTHLY EXPENSES 
Rent (condominium fees) 
Mortgage (garage payment) 
Maintenance (residence) 
Real property insurance 
Food & Household Expense 
Utilities (water, gas, electricity) 
Telephone v 
Laundry & cleaning 
Clothing 
Medical (prescriptions/insulin 
chiropractor) 
Dental 
Insurance 
life 
health & accident 
accident 
Entertainment 
Travel 
Incidentals: 
grooming 
gifts 
Auto payment 
Auto insurance 
Auto expense 
Newspapers/magazines 
Tithing/church donations 
Tax on alimony 
143.00 
721.00 
50.00 
47.80 
220.00 
140.00 
50.00 
15.00 
100.00 
150.00 
15.00 
(1) 
300.00 (2) 
100.00 
335.00 
(3) 
TOTAL 
75.00 
300.00 
455.00 
63.00 
150.00 
25.00 
240.00 
433.00 
4,127.00 (4) 
Note 1: Defendant will continue to maintain life insurance policy on 
Plaintiff; policy paid in full; transfer ownership to Defendant. 
Note 2: Defendant is diabetic; many costs of illness cannot be insured 
against; quotes are as stated. 
Note 3: Includes birthday and Christmas gifts for 3 
children and 15 grandchildren 
Note 4: Does not include any money for retirement or attorney fees. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
dlAA^uUL 
TERRAL H. ERNSTSEN, 
PLAINTIFF, 
-VS-
ILA M. ERNSTSEN, 
DEFENDANT. 
CIVIL NO. D-91-4904104 
JUDGE'S RULING 
* * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON FRIDAY, THE 8TH DAY 
OF JANUARY, 1993, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 2:20 O'CLOCK 
P.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
* * * 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. r>f! 
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FOR THE 
FOR THE 
JUDGE'S 
A P P 
PLAINTIFF: 
DEFENDANT: 
RULING 
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| 
R A N C E S 
CLARK R. WARD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
64 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SUITE #205 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
CRAIG M. PETERSON 
LITTLEFIELD 6 PETERSON 
426 SOUTH 500 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
* * 
fi E X 
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EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. C 4 5 1 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 JUDGE YOUNG: THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS. MR. 
3 PETERSON, I AM GOING TO ASK YOU IF YOU WILL PREPARE FIND-
4 INGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONSISTENT WITH THE 
5 COURT'S RULING. 
6 j MR. PETERSON: I WILL DO SO. 
7 JUDGE YOUNG: BUT EACH OF YOU WILL TAKE NOTES ON 
8 THIS SO YOU'LL BE SURE THAT WE'RE ALL COMPARABLE AND ACCU-
9 RATE. 
|0 THE FIRST THING, OF COURSE, IS THE COURT FINDS 
11 THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION AND THAT THE—WELL, WAIT A 
12 MINUTE. YOU'RE THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE. MR. WARD, YOU 
13 CAN PREPARE THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. I'M SORRY. 
14 MR. WARD, THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A DECREE 
15 OF DIVORCE BASED UPON IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES. 
16 MR. PETERSON, IS THERE ANY REASON YOU WISH THAT 
17 TO BE RECIPROCAL? I'VE HEARD EVIDENCE ADEQUATE FOR BOTH. 
18 MR. PETERSON: I THINK IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL. 
19 JUDGE YOUNG: IF YOU WILL PREPARE IT THAT WAY 
20 THEN, MR. WARD? 
21 MR. WARD: OKAY. 
22 JUDGE YOUNG: THE COURT FINDS THEN THAT THE 
23 PROPERTY SHOULD BE DIVIDED CONSISTENT WITH THE PARTIES' 
24 STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT AND THE COURT NOTES THAT EACH 
25 PARTY IS BEING AWARDED A MARITAL ESTATE WORTH $95,215.00. 
1 THE COURT DETERMINES THAT MR. ERNSTSEN'S INCOME 
2 IS $648.00 PER WEEK, WHICH MULTIPLIED BY 52 WEEKS AND 
3 DIVIDED THEN BY 12 MONTHS, IS $2,808.00 PER MONTH. 
4 THAT HE IS BEING AWARDED, LIKE THE DEFENDANT, AN 
5 ASSET, MARITAL ESTATE WHICH IS IN THE AMOUNT OF $95,215.00. 
6 THAT ASSET SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO WORK AND THAT ASSET SHOULD 
7 WORK, IF IT WERE WORKING, AT THE RATE OF EIGHT AND-A-HALF 
8 PERCENT ON THE AVERAGE. I THINK THAT IS A NOMINAL RATE FOR 
9 AN EQUITABLE ASSET. IF IT WERE WORKING AT THAT RATE IT 
10 WOULD YIELD $674.00 PER MONTH. 
n NOW, MR. ERNSTSEN HAS THE BENEFIT OF HAVING HIS 
1 2 WORK BETTER THAN THAT BECAUSE OF HIS LEASES ON THE TRUCKS 
13 THAT ARE PART OF HIS ASSET AND HE HAS IT WORKING AT THE 
14 RATE OF $780.78. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 674.44, WHICH 
15 IS BEING IMPUTED TO BOTH PARTIES, AND THE 780.78, IS 
16 $106.34 PER MONTH. SO MR. ERNSTSEN'S INCOME IS DETERMINED 
17 BY THE COURT TO REASONABLY BE $2,808.00 AS SALARIED INCOME, 
18 $106.34 AS SURPLUS EQUITABLE EARNINGS, FOR A COMBINED TOTAL 
19 OF $2,914.34 PER MONTH. THAT TIMES 12 IS $34,972.08. THAT 
20 DIVIDED BY TWO IS $17,486.00 THAT SHOULD GO TO EACH. 
21 DIVIDING THAT BY TWO IT IS $1457.00 PER MONTH. THE COURT 
22 DETERMINES THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR MR. ERNSTSEN TO 
23 BE REQUIRED TO PAY $1450.00 PER MONTH AS ALIMONY. ALL 
24 RIGHT? THAT'S THE BASIS OF THE DETERMINATION. 
25 THE COURT ALSO DETERMINES THAT ON THE FINAL 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.
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ISSUES THAT WERE BEING DISCUSSED A MOMENT AGO BY MR. PETER-
SON THAT MR. ERNSTSEN IS ORDERED TO PAY THE PROPERTY TAXES 
ON THE FRUITLAND PROPERTY FOR 1992, THEREAFTER, IT'S THE 
BURDEN OF THE DEFENDANT. 
MR. ERNSTSEN IS ORDERED TO PAY THE REGISTRATION 
AND TAXES ON THE VEHICLE IN THE POSSESSION OF THE DEFEN-
DANT. THAT BEING IN THE RANGE OF PLUS OR MINUS $275.00. 
MR. ERNSTSEN IS ORDERED TO PAY THE VISA CARD. 
THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN STIPULATED TO AS ONE OF THE LIABILI-
TIES. 
MR. ERNSTSEN IS FURTHER ORDERED UNDER THE CIRCUM-
STANCES OF THIS CASE ON THE FACT THAT I DO FIND THAT THE 
DEFENDANT IS IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE IN TERMS OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS THE ABILITY TO EARN, THAT IT IS 
REASONABLE TO EXPECT HIM TO CONTRIBUTE TO HER FEES AND 
COSTS AND THAT SHE DOESN'T HAVE REASONABLE INCOME TO DO SO 
OTHER THAN OUT OF THE ALIMONY AND SO THE COURT DETERMINES 
THAT HE SHOULD PAY TO HER THE SUM OF $4,000.00 IN 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. THAT MEANS THAT THE REMAINDER OF THE 
BURDEN OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WOULD REMAIN THE DEFENDANT'S FOR 
THE BALANCE OF HER FEES AND, OF COURSE, HE IS OBLIGATED TO 
PAY HIS OWN FEES. 
ANYTHING ELSE THAT'S LEFT IN DISPUTE? 
MR. WARD: ONE MINOR DETAIL, YOUR HONOR. THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF MRS. ERNSTSEN'S PAYMENT ON THE CABIN AND 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. rs <*. * r i 
THE EXPLORER PAYMENT AND THE GARAGE PAYMENTS HAS TO BE SET. 
I KNOW THAT THEY HAVE MENTIONED FEBRUARY 1ST BUT HERE WE 
ARE WE'RE ONLY ON THE 8TH OF JANUARY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THIS WILL ALL BE EFFECTIVE AS OF 
JANUARY 1ST. 
MR. WARD: THANK YOU. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ANYTHING ELSE? ANY OTHER DETAILS? 
MR. PETERSON: I'M GOING TO REQUEST SPECIFIC 
FINDINGS OF FACT FROM THE COURT. I'M GOING TO REQUEST THAT 
THE COURT FINDS IN MRS. ERNSTSEN'S EXPENSES—IN MRS. 
ERNSTSEN'S EXPENSES RECOGNITION OF HER MORTGAGE PAYMENT OF 
$721.00 PER MONTH, RECOGNITION OF HER EXPLORER PAYMENT OF 
$455.00 PER MONTH. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WAIT A MINUTE. ARE YOU GOING TO 
LOOK AT A LIST? HAVE YOU GOT A LIST YOU'RE LOOKING AT? 
MR. PETERSON: I TOOK THESE OFF DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 9. 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME GET TO THE EXHIBIT 9. ALL 
RIGHT. FIRST OF ALL, I DENY THE REQUEST ON THE MORTGAGE 
PAYMENT OF 721. THAT IS A REPAYMENT FOR A GARAGE AND IF 
THAT WERE REFINANCED AT A REASONABLE MORTGAGE RATE THERE'S 
ONLY A PRINCIPAL BALANCE THERE OF $9,000.00 SO I DON'T FIND 
THAT IS AN INADEQUATE BASIS FOR HER RENT. IF SHE IS GOING 
TO REMAIN AND LIVE IN THE HOME THEN SHE OUGHT TO FINANCE 
THAT OVER A SUBSTANTIAL PERIOD OF TIME. 15 YEARS, UNDER A 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. rnK^ 6 
NORMAL MORTGAGE, AND SHE'D BE PAYING PENNIES. SO I DECLINE 
2 TO MAKE THAT. 
MR. PETERSON: I JUST WANT THE COURT'S FINDINGS 
4 ON THESE PARTICULAR EXPENSES. 
. JUDGE YOUNG: I UNDERSTAND. 
6 MR. PETERSON: AND HOW THE COURT'S HANDLING THIS 
7 DECISION. 
g THE NEXT ISSUE IS THE EXPLORER. THE AUTO PAYMENT 
9 ON THE EXPLORER OF $455.00 PER MONTH. I'M ASKING FOR A 
10 SPECIFIC FINDING IN RECOGNITION OF THAT EXPENSE AS WELL. 
,, JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT IS YOUR REQUEST? I MEAN, THAT 
12 IS THE AMOUNT. 
13 MR. PETERSON: JUST TO RECOGNIZE IT IS A $455.00 
14 AMOUNT EXPENSE SHE IS GOING TO HAVE TO PAY A MONTH. 
15 JUDGE YOUNG: I THINK THAT GOES WITHOUT SAYING, 
16 MR. PETERSON. 
17 MR. PETERSON: YOUR HONOR, HERE IS MY PROBLEM. 
18 YOU'VE GIVEN HER $1450.00 A MONTH AS ALIMONY. 
19 JUDGE YOUNG: RIGHT. 
20 MR. PETERSON: TAXES ON THAT IS GOING TO BE 
21 $300.00 PER MONTH. 
22 JUDGE YOUNG: HHM-HHM. 
23 MR. PETERSON: AND I'M ASKING FOR A SPECIFIC 
24 FINDING ON THAT AS WELL. 
25 THEN SHE'S GOT A $455.00 AUTO PAYMENT. THOSE TWO 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 00**5(5 7 
, TOGETHER ARE $755.00. 
SHE IS GOING TO HAVE TO PAY OFF THIS MORTGAGE 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
10 
PAYMENT. AND IF SHE REFINANCES IT, EVEN IF IT'S AT 
$200.00 A MONTH, THEN THAT'S $955.00 IN EXPENSES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT IS THE PRINCIPAL BALANCE? 
MR. PETERSON: IT'S ABOUT $9,000.00. 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME JUST GIVE YOU, SO THAT YOU 
HAVE BEFORE YOU, THE NUMBER THAT WOULD POTENTIALLY BE 
9 AVAILABLE TO HER. IF SHE WERE TO AMORTIZE THAT OVER A 20 
YEAR PERIOD OF TIME AT 8.25, WHICH I THINK IS A RELATIVELY 
H I HIGH INTEREST RATE FOR $9,000.00, SHE WOULD BE MAKING A 
12 MONTHLY PAYMENT OF $76.69. 
13 MR. PETERSON: AND THE COURT'S FINDING THAT BASED 
14 ON THE ALIMONY AWARD IT'S A REASONABLE POSITION FROM THE 
15 COURT'S VIEW SHE SHOULD REFINANCE THAT OVER 15 YEARS? 
16 JUDGE YOUNG: I DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH HER 
17 DOING THAT. THE REFINANCING IT. IF SHE REFINANCES IT OVER 
18 I 15 YEARS—THAT WASN'T THE NUMBER I GAVE YOU BUT— 
19 MR. PETERSON: I'M SORRY, I THOUGHT YOU SAID 15. 
20 JUDGE YOUNG: I DIDN'T, BUT IF SHE DID, THAT'S 
21 $87.31. SO YOU SEE, TO ME, SHE COULD TAKE THAT NUMBER OF 
22 $9,000.00—WHAT IS THE UNPAID BALANCE ON THE— 
23 MR. PETERSON: APPROXIMATELY $9,000.00. 
24 JUDGE YOUNG: NO, I KNOW THAT, BUT I WAS JUST 
25 ABOUT TO ASK YOU ON THE AUTOMOBILE. 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. rrt.zi 8 
MR. WARD: $455.00 PER MONTH. 
JUDGE YOUNG: UNPAID BALANCE. 
MR. PETERSON: $12,000.00. BUT I THINK IT'S NOW 
ABOUT 11,500. 
JUDGE YOUNG: 11,500 PLUS $9,000.00 IS 
$20,500.00. AND IF SHE WERE TO FINANCE THAT OVER A 15 YEAR 
PERIOD OF TIME, ALL OF THOSE DEBTS COMBINED WOULD BE 
$198.88. 
MR. PETERSON: ARE YOU SAYING THAT SHE SHOULD 
OBTAIN THE MONEY FROM THE HOUSE TO PAY OFF THE—YOU CAN'T 
FINANCE AN AUTOMOBILE FOR 15 YEARS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I DON'T HAVE—SHE DOESN'T HAVE ANY 
PROBLEM. SHE'S GOT A HOUSE THAT SHE HAS AN EQUITY IN OF 
$75,000.00, PLUS OR MINUS DOLLARS-
MR. PETERSON: I'M NOT ARGUING WITH THE COURT, 
I'M JUST TRYING TO GET SOME SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF RECORD. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I'M NOT GOING TO MAKE THAT SPECIFIC 
FINDING BECAUSE WHAT THAT REQUIRES IS THAT I FIND THAT SHE 
HAS NO OBLIGATION TO DO ANY FINANCIAL PLANNING, AND SHE HAS 
AN OBLIGATION TO DO FINANCIAL PLANNING JUST LIKE ANYONE 
ELSE. SHE'S BEEN AWARDED $95,215.00— 
MR. PETERSON: ALL RIGHT. I UNDERSTAND THAT. 
YOU SEE, I THINK THE COURT'S RULING AND THE WAY YOU CALCU-
LATED IT IS IN ERROR BASED ON THE DECISION AND SO ALL I'M 
TRYING TO DO IS LAY A FINDING OF FACT AS TO HER EXPENSES 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
USE SAVAGE AND ITS PROGENY ABSOLUTELY STATES THAT WE 
„vr TO DERIVE SUPPORT FROM A DIVISION OF PROPERTY, IT ARE NOl J-w 
SUPPOSED TO BE BASED ON INCOME AND NOT A PROPERTY DIVI-
TON AND I'M NOT ARGUING THE COURT'S DECISION. I HAVE 
NEVER ARGUED THE COURT'S DECISIONS. I ACCEPT THE RULINGS 
OF COURTS. I DON'T BELIEVE THERE'S SUCH A THING AS A 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND, IN MY OPINION, I THINK IT 
IS ABSOLUTELY ERRONEOUS FOR ATTORNEYS TO STAND UP AT THE 
CONCLUSION OF A RULING AND TELL THE COURT I DON'T LIKE YOUR 
RULING, I WANT TO ARGUE IT SOME MORE. THAT'S NOT WHAT I'M 
DOING. I'M SIMPLY TRYING TO LAY THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR HER 
EXPENSES AND THE COURT'S DECISION SO WE CAN LAY THAT OUT IN 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT VERY ADEQUATELY BECAUSE SHE MAY CHOOSE 
TO APPEAL THIS, AS THE COURT IS AWARE. AND IF SHE MAKES 
THAT DECISION I WANT A VERY CLEAR FACTUAL BASIS TO TAKE UP 
TO THE APPELLATE COURT. THAT'S ALL I'M TRYING T0 ACCOM-
PLISH. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IN ORDER TO LAY THAT THEN THE COURT 
WOULD FIND THAT IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO REFINANCE THE TWO 
MAJOR EXPENSES OF HER CURRENT MONTHLY EXPENSES, THE $721.00 
MORTGAGE PAYMENT AND THE $455.00 PAYMENT, AND THAT SHE 
COULD EASILY DO THAT OVER A 15 YEAR PERIOD OF TIME FOR A 
COMBINED MONTHLY EXPENSE OF $198.88. 
MR. PETERSON: ALL RIGHT. AND THEN THE OTHER 
EXPENSES, I THINK WE ADDRESSED THOSE ADEQUATELY IN THE 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. in 
ON
 Q F TESTIMONY WHERE SHE CAN MAKE SAVINGS. I 
trTttV W E NEED TO ADDRESS THOSE OTHERWISE. DON'T THINK Wfc « 
THERE IS ONE I WOULD LIKE THE COURT'S RULING ON, 
,r*-c TF SHE DOESN'T APPEAL THIS IT WOULD BE INTERESTING BECAUSE J-r 
HAVE THAT TALKED ABOUT IN THE APPELLATE RECORD, AND 
HATiS THE TITHING ISSUE. WE ALWAYS TALK ABOUT THAT IN 
THESE CASES BUT WE NEVER HAVE AN ACTUAL FINDING ON THAT. 
AND IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THESE PARTIES WERE VERY 
DEVOUT, AND HE WAS MISSION PRESIDENT, BRANCH PRESIDENT, I'M 
SORRY, AND THAT WAS A HABIT OR PATTERN OF THEIRS, SHE'S 
INDICATED SHE CONSIDERS THAT A NECESSITY OF LIFE. I WOULD 
LIKE THE COURT'S RULING ON THAT PARTICULAR ISSUE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THE COURT FINDS THAT TO 
MAKE A RULING ON THAT ISSUE CAUSES THE COURT TO INJECT 
ITSELF INTO THE APPROPRIATE—INTO THE INAPPROPRIATE AREA OF 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE. THAT IS AN AREA IN WHICH 
SHE HAS THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHAT SHE WISHES TO DO AND, 
IN FACT, IF SHE WANTED TO GIVE ALL HER MONEY, AND LIVE AS A 
PAUPER, TO A RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION, IT WOULD NOT BE MY 
PREROGATIVE TO INJECT MYSELF INTO THAT DECISION. THERE-
FORE, I WOULD DECLINE TO MAKE ANY DETERMINATION AS TO THE 
REASONABLENESS OF HER TITHING CONTRIBUTION. SHE MAY FEEL 
PERSONALLY COMPELLED TO DO THAT, SHE MAY FEEL COMMITTED TO 
THAT OBJECTIVE. I NEITHER COMPLEMENT NOR CONDEMN THAT 
DECISION. I THINK IT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE COURT TO 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. n n * ^  n 
1 
2 
3 
G E T INVOLVED IN I T . 
I WILL TELL YOU FURTHER THAT THE COURT WOULD 
NOT-
THAT ONE PARTY COULD BEAR THEIR TITHING COST OR THE 
OTHER PARTY COULD BEAR THEIR TITHING COST. SO I DECLINE TO 
CONSIDER THAT AS HAVING ANY BEARING IN A COURT OF LAW ON 
WHICH I MIGHT DETERMINE THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY OR THE 
FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF EITHER PARTY. 
MR. PETERSON: ALL RIGHT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING FURTHER? 
MR. PETERSON: NOTHING. 
WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE COURT TO CONSIDER 
THING ISSUE AN ISSUE OF SUFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE TO 
TIFY, FOR INSTANCE, A HIGHER AWARD OF ALIMONY OR SUPPORT 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
I I 
12 
13 
1 4 JUDGE YOUNG: MR. WARD, YOU'LL PREPARE THE FIND-
1 5 INGS, SUBMIT THEM TO MR. PETERSON FOR APPROVAL AS TO FORM? 
1 6 DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER? 
17 MR. WARD: YES. I JUST WANTED TO MAKE ABSOLUTELY 
18 SURE IN MY OWN MIND, AND I THINK IN MR. ERNSTSEN'S MIND, 
19 AGAIN, WITH THE PROPERTY DIVISION, THE AMOUNTS AND EVERY-
20 THING, I UNDERSTAND FINE; THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES DOES 
21 CONSIDER THE FACT THAT MRS. ERNSTSEN I S GOING TO RECEIVE 
22 ONE-HALF OF THE I . R . A . ACCOUNT PLUS, WHICH I S APPROXIMATELY 
23 $ 2 5 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 , PLUS FROM THAT SAME ACCOUNT AN ADDITIONAL 
24 $ 1 9 , 0 8 9 . 0 0 TO EQUALIZE THE PROPERTY DIVISION. SO DESPITE 
25 THE FACT SHE I S GOING TO GET THAT, MORE THAN LIKELY A LUMP 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C . S . R . p~ A , . r 12 - - / (, flLIC 
SUM, MR. ERNSTSEN WILL NEVERTHELESS BE ORDERED TO PAY THOSE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES? 
JUDGE YOUNG: THAT IS CORRECT. THAT'S THE WAY IT 
4 IS. NOW, EACH OF YOU PARTIES ARE STILL UNDER OATH. THERE 
c IS A PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT THAT HAS BEEN STIPULATED TO. 
g THAT'S THE DIVISION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. I DON'T WANT ANY 
7 DIFFICULTY WITH THAT. 
g MR. ERNSTSEN, DO YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND TO THE 
9 TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THAT PORTION, OF THAT STIPULATED 
10 PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT? 
,, MR. ERNSTSEN: OH YEAH, I AGREED TO THAT. 
J2 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. MRS. ERNSTSEN, DO YOU 
13 AGREE TO BE BOUND TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE PER-
14 SONAL PROPERTY DIVISION? 
15 MRS. ERNSTSEN: YES, I DO. 
16 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
17 MR. WARD: ONE— 
18 JUDGE YOUNG: MR. WARD? 
19 MR. WARD: YES. ONE MORE MINOR DETAIL. AT THE 
20 CABIN PROPERTY THERE ARE TWO HORSE FEEDERS AND A TEXAS 
21 LONGHORN WEATHER VANE MR. ERNSTSEN WOULD LIKE TO RECOVER. 
22 THEY'RE NOT WORTH ANYTHING, THEY'RE JUST OLD SENTIMENTAL 
23 PIECES OF THINGS. 
24 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. NO OBJECTION TO THAT? 
25 MR. PETERSON: NO. 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. £ ' £ 3 3 ? 
1 JUDGE YOUNG: FINE. ANYTHING ELSE THAT NEEDS TO 
2 BE RESOLVED? 
3 MR. PETERSON: NOTHING. 
4 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU EACH. COURT'S IN RECESS. 
5 (WHEREUPON, THE JUDGE'S RULING WAS CONCLUDED). 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
* * * 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.
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Craig M. Peterson (2579) 
Joanna B. Sagers (5632) 
Attorney for Defendant 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
TERRAL H. ERNSTSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ILA M. ERNSTSEN, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ILA ERNSTSEN 
Case No. 914904104DA 
Judge David S. Young 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ILA M. ERNSTSEN, being first duly sworn upon oath 
deposes, and states as follows: 
1. I am the Plaintiff above-named. 
2. This matter was pre-tried before the Honorable David 
S. Young, a Judge of the above-entitled Court on January 4, 1993 at 
the hour of 9:45 a.m. At the pre-trial, Judge Young attempted very 
strenuously to cause me to accept settlement in this case. He told 
00165 
me at the pre-trial that I had better settle this case for 
$1,400.00 in alimony because I would not get that much at a trial. 
3. In addition, Judge Young was informed at the pre-
trial that the Plaintiff had two sources of income, income earned 
from his employment with Ernstsen Plumbing & Heating and $3,500.00 
per month in lease payments from automobiles which the Plaintiff 
owns personally but leases back to Ernstsen Plumbing & Heating. 
4. At the pre-trial, Judge Young indicated to me that 
for the purpose of determining alimony, he was not going to 
recognize the income earned from the lease-back of the automobiles 
by Plaintiff to Ernstsen Plumbing. Further, Judge Young began to 
argue a personal theory of his own, not supported by argument from 
counsel for either of the parties. His theory was that the 
Plaintiff cannot be awarded an asset that earns income and then be 
charged for that income to determine alimony. 
5. The case was unable to be settled at pre-trial and 
Judge Young ordered that trial commence three days later on January 
7, 1993 at the hour of 9:30 a.m. 
6. At the trial, a document was submitted as 
Defendant's Exhibit "1." That document was an evaluation of the 
business accomplished by Vaughn Cox, an expert on behalf of the 
Defendant. The document established that the Plaintiff leased 
vehicles back to the company, Ernstsen Plumbing & Heating, Inc., as 
2 
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a tax saving method. In addition, the Defendant testified that he 
had received income from leasing vehicles to the company, that he 
had done so for many years, that he considered the income from the 
leases to be a part of his ordinary monthly income, and that the 
primary purpose of the leases were for tax benefits. Judge Young 
expressed from the bench that he recognized the tax savings 
implications of the leasing arrangements with the vehicles. 
7. Randall J. Petersen, a Certified Public Accountant, 
an expert who appeared on my behalf, testified that the Plaintiff 
had historical earnings of $66,025.00. Those historical earnings 
were based upon the Plaintiff's ordinary income from the business, 
as well as the income he received from leasing the vehicles. Most 
of the cross-examination of Randall J. Petersen was conducted by 
Judge Young. He clearly was not impartial. He spent much of his 
time asserting his personal view that the income received by 
Plaintiff from the leased vehicles was income received from an 
asset, and it would be unfair to require the Plaintiff to count 
income which is generated from an asset for the purpose of 
calculating alimony unless the same kind of treatment was applied 
to property which would be awarded to me. 
8. Throughout the proceedings, it was clear, not only 
in the examination of Randall J. Petersen, but in closing argument, 
during cross-examination of the Plaintiff, and at many other times, 
3 
00167 
that Judge Young had formed a personal opinion during the pre-
trial, or even before the pre-trial, and no evidence presented 
would ever change his position. It was clear to me that Judge 
Young had become personally involved in this case and he was unable 
to make a decision which would result in an award of alimony which 
might be different from that which he had arbitrarily decided 
during the pre-trial. 
9. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Young stated 
a theory that I should be earning income on the property awarded to 
me, consisting of my personal residence, furniture and furnishings, 
and an automobile. Based upon that theory, one which he 
demonstrated to be his personal view, as opposed to the evidence 
presented, Judge Young then awarded me $1,450.00 per month as 
alimony. 
10. In addition, Judge Young completely ignored my 
inability to earn income, my ability to obtain financing and my age 
and health when he considered my expenses. Upon the request of my 
attorney for specific findings by the Court to recognize that I 
would have a tax liability on alimony of approximately $300.00 per 
month, a mortgage payment in the amount of $768.00 per month, and 
an automobile payment in the amount of $455.00 per month, Judge 
Young stated that he recognized the tax liability at $300.00 and 
accepted all of my expenses and liabilities, but refused to 
4 
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recognize the mortgage payment and the automobile payment at the 
current monthly cost; the two totalled more than $1,200.00 per 
month. Judge Young stated that I could simply engage in a little 
bit of "creative financing," and that I could refinance the 
automobile and the mortgage (which has only eight payments 
remaining) for fifteen years to pay those obligations. It is clear 
to me that he became so personally involved in supporting his 
personal argument of how this case should be tried and how it 
should be decided, that he refused to recognize the facts presented 
to him. 
11. I believe Judge Young became so personally involved 
as an advocate in the trial of this case that he was unable to 
exercise impartial judgment. I cannot receive a fair and 
reasonable trial from Judge Young. It is my intent to file a 
Motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure based on Judge Young making a decision which my 
counsel advises me is in error of law. I do not believe Judge 
Young will be able to fairly decide either the Motion for a new 
trial, or if a new trial is granted, I do not believe he will be 
able to impartially rule upon the evidence presented. 
12. I believe Judge Young should recuse himself from 
these proceedings, that this matter should be referred to the 
presiding judge, and a new judge assigned for trial in this case. 
5 
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Further, I believe it is reasonable that the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered in 
this matter on February 3, 1993 be set aside, except for the 
dissolution of the marriage, and that the Temporary Order should 
continue in effect pending a new trial in this matter• 
DATED this day of February, 1993. 
I£A WTERNSTSEN 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me by 
, the signer of the foregoing document. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this day of 
, 1993. 
My commission expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at 
Ernst.AFF/P2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, AFFIDAVIT OF ILA M. ERNSTSEN, this 
day of February, 1993, to: 
Clark R. Ward, Esq. 
64 East 6400 South, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TERRAL H. ERNSTSEN, 
vs. 
ELA M. ERNSTSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
SETTING PLEADING SCHEDULE 
AND 
DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL 
CASE # 914904104 
This case is returned to the undersigned to render a decision on the defendant's 
Motion for a New Trial. The matter has been delayed through the defendant's efforts to 
have this Judge removed under Rule 63 URCP. On December 1, 1993, that Motion was 
denied by order of the Presiding Judge of the District and thereafter on December 9, 1993 a 
"Notice to Submit for Decision" the defendant's Motion for a New Trial was filed. 
The basis for the Motion for a New Trial, in part, results from the defendant's belief 
that the Judge in this case showed bias and prejudice against her in dealing with the division 
of marital assets. 
The record in this case speaks for itself as to whether "Judge Young was clearly not 
impartial"...and whether "He (Judge Young) spent much of the trial asserting his personal 
view that the income received by Plaintiff from the leased vehicles was income received from 
an asset" rather than income from "earnings" such as from one's labor. (Defendant's 
"Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial" at p. 3) 
The disputed portion of the PaAy's marital estate dealt with the consideration by the 
00360 
Court of the total amount of approximately $180,000.00. The amount was represented in 
two assets of approximately equal amounts. The first was the parties residence occupied by 
the defendant and valued at $90,000.00, and the second was the equitable value of the 
Ernstsen Plumbing business, primarily represented in the business assets and inventory 
including certain company owned trucks, likewise valued at $90,000.00. 
In the Pre-Trial Conference, in an effort to be candid and seek to obtain the true 
benefit of such a conference, the Court stated to the Parties that the total $180,000.00 marital 
estate value would "likely" be divided equally. Further that "earnings" would come from 
"employment" efforts not from a working "asset" unless it could be shown that the "asset" 
was, in fact, earning "excessive" income in part to avoid other types of earnings which may 
occur in an effort to minimize taxes such as PICA etc. The court mentioned that both assets 
should be considered to have a "working" value, (i.e. the "home" and the "business" should 
be expected to be invested to create a certain "yield.") The Court further informed counsel 
that in considering the Plaintiffs "earnings" the court would look to his "salary" and any 
"excessive" earnings from the $90,000.00 business asset. 
The Court's discussion and candor apparently offended the defendant and her counsel. 
The Court's ruling was based upon the consideration of the (1) needs of the wife; the 
(2) ability of the wife to produce income; and (3) the ability of the husband to provide. 
Since nearly one year has elapsed and since counsel have recommended "amended" findings 
and decree, the court invites counsel to propose final findings and a decree based upon the 
[2] 
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evidence and the ruling of the court. The court will review the pleadings and render a ruling 
thereon. If oral argument is desired, counsel are invited to request the same. The court 
desires to deal with this matter with dispatch. Recognizing that the Christmas Season is upon 
us, the court requests counsel to provide their pleadings simultaneously on December 22, 
1993. Each side may respond to the other by December 29, 1993. If oral argument is 
requested it should be done with the responsive filing. The Court will rule thereafter in 
order that a final order may be entered and the parties may then consider their future legal 
remedies. 
As a result of the need for further pleadings, the defendant's Motion for a New Trial 
is denied without prejudice. 
Dated, December 13, 1993. 
[3] 
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Third Judicsai District 
DEC 1 1393 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By ^ ^ ^ tSAH fr*S 
I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT Deputy Cterk 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY# STATE OF UTAH 
TERRAL H. ERNSTSEN, : SUMMARY DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff# : CASE NO. 914904104 
vs. : 
ILA M. ERNSTSEN, : 
Defendant. : 
The assigned judge referred this matter to the presiding judge 
upon determining that the defendant's Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, affidavit was legally insufficient. 
The context from which the presiding judge should review the 
affidavit derives from the language of Rule 63(b): alleged bias or 
prejudice for or against a party or counsel. The bias alleged in 
this matter is not claimed to be against a party or counsel. 
Defendant expressly admits as much at page 7 of her February 12, 
199 3 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Recusal. 
The centerpiece of defendant's challenge to the assigned judge 
is the claim that he applied his own personal view in analyzing 
issues surrounding alimony. Defendant complains that the assigned 
judge refused to properly consider income from business assets 
awarded to plaintiff in determining the amount of alimony for 
defendant. Assuming that defendant's allegations are factually 
O r *Nr; o XJ sJ 0 L* 
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correct, defendant's real complaint is that for purposes of 
determining alimony the assigned judge equated the plaintiff's 
income producing assets with assets awarded to defendant which 
appear to be assets that defer living expenses. 
Regardless of whether the assigned judge's approach was 
correct in this case or is an appropriate approach in a vacuum, the 
issue appears to be one more appropriately addressed by an 
appellate court. For the presiding judge to premise a 
determination that the assigned judge has a Rule 63(b) bias or 
prejudice for or against a party or counsel on the alimony claims 
of defendant, it would require the presiding judge to act as an 
appellate judge, to substitute his judgment for that of the 
assigned judge and thus raise serious questions under the law of 
the case doctrine. Such an approach is not a proper application of 
Rule 63(b). The appropriate venue for this challenge is an 
appellate court. 
There are other peripheral issues deserving of comment. It 
would appear that defendant also challenges alleged statements by 
the assigned judge at a pretrial suggesting that defendant ought to 
accept $1,400 per month in alimony because she would likely receive 
less following a trial. This particular challenge is both 
factually and legally insufficient. The actual amount of alimony 
00:53 
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awarded was $1,450 per month, $50.00 per month more than it is 
alleged the assigned judge indicated would be too high. These 
facts do not suggest a bias or prejudice for or against any party 
or counsel. 
Beyond its factual insufficiency, defendant's challenge 
strikes at the heart of a practice in the Third District. 
Pretrials in domestic cases traditionally present opportunities for 
commissioners and judges to participate in settlement efforts. 
Such direct intervention by adjudicators allow the parties to hear 
what the outcome of trial may be under various factual assumptions 
based on proffers. This practice is a legitimate and traditional 
one which generally proceeds without claims of prejudgment directed 
at the assigned judge. The claim of prejudgment in this case is 
one which, if accepted, would undermine the Third District's 
pretrial settlement practice. More significantly, it would do so 
in circumstances where the facts do not support the claim and the 
claim is premised on a matter which should be resolved on appeal. 
Finally, one appropriate view is that defendant's evidence was 
insufficient to render inapplicable a concept legitimately raised 
by the assigned judge in a pretrial settlement conference. 
If the issue of bias and prejudice is a legitimate one, it was 
manifest at the pretrial conference. Defendant, however, did not 
00354 
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raise the issue at that time nor did she raise it in the three 
intervening days before trial. Because this matter was not timely 
raised before trial, it is now presented in a procedural chronology 
prejudicial to plaintiff and the court which has limited capacity 
and resources. Defendant's affidavit effectively seeks to replace 
the trial judge with a new judge to resolve the motion for a new 
trial. 
Defendant suggests bias and prejudice resulting from the trial 
judge's acknowledgment of a tax savings resulting from a lease 
arrangement on vehicles. No such bias or prejudice has been 
demonstrated. Additionally, defendant suggests that the assigned 
judge's examination of her expert suggests bias and prejudice. 
Neither the fact of or the quantum of examination by a judge in a 
nonjury trial is suggestive generally of a bias or prejudice. 
Furthermore, no specific bias or prejudice is demonstrated in this 
case from the trial judge's actual examination of defendant's 
witness. 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant has not demonstrated 
actual bias and prejudice and her affidavit is not timely. The 
affidavit therefore is legally insufficient. The matter will be 
0 V; ct)0 
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referred back to the assigned judge to resolve all post trial 
motions. 
Dated this /JK day of December, 1993. 
I A *" A-' f1~~ "'^3 *l\ 
MICHAEL ff. MURPHY 
DISTRICTICOURT JUDGE j 
' - : / 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Summary Decision and Order, to the following, this | 
day of December, 1993: 
Clark R. Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
64 East 6400 South, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Craig M. Peterson 
Joanna B. Sagers 
Attorneys for Defendant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Honorable David S* Young 
District Court Judge 
24 0 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
— W ^ ?^Wl 
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HUSBAND'S MONTHLY NET 
AVAILABLE FUNDS AT HIS 
"HISTORICAL" SALARY MINUS 
TRUCK LEASES 
Pre-September 1992 Salary: 
TR. 32 Gross Income $828.00 
per week 
Net income $501.51 
per week 
x 52 wks -5- 12 months 
Net Salary per month 
$2,173.25 
HUSBAND'S MONTHLY NET 
AVAILABLE FUNDS AT HIS 
"HISTORICAL" SALARY PLUS 
TRUCK LEASES 
TR.22 Gross per week $780.78 
X 4.3 = $3,357.35 
per month 
TR.17 Net salary per month 
projected from 
(Pit's EX.4) $2,173.25 
Total: $5,530.60 
TR.25 Minus debt service on 
vehicles and other 
debts assumed . • . 
(Pit's Ex.5) $3,110.54 
Leaving: $2,420.06 
(Net Disposable 
Income) 
TR.25 Defendant to assume 
cabin payment after 
trial of $721.10 giving 
plaintiff net disposal 
income of $3,141.17 
Less: Alimony $1,450.00 
Total: $1,691.17 
(For Living Expenses) 
| HUSBAND'S MONTHLY NET 
1 AVAILABLE FUNDS AT HIS | CURRENT SALARY MINUS | TRUCK LEASES 
1 Gross Income $643.46 
1 per week 
| (Pit's Exhibit 4) 
TR. 17 $420.53 per week 
II 
HUSBAND'S MONTHLY NET 
AVAILABLE FUNDS AT HIS 
CURRENT SALARY PLUS 
TRUCK LEASES 
TR.22 Gross per week $780.78 
X 4.3 = $3,357.35 
per month 
TR.17 Net salary per month 
projected from 
(Pit's Ex.4) $1,854.15 
Total: $5,211.50 
TR.25 Minus debt service on 
vehicles and other 
debts assumed . . . 
(Pit's Ex.5) $3,110.54 
Leaving: $2,100.96 
(Net Disposable 
Income) 1  
TR.25 Defendant to assume 
cabin payment after 
trial of $721.10 giving 
plaintiff net disposal 
income of $2,822.061 
Less: Alimony $1,450.00 
Leaves: $1,372.06 
(For living expenses) 
1
 Plaintiff testified that his net disposable income was 
approximately $1,900.00 to pay any alimony and living expenses. 
(TR.26) 
